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Preservation theorems for strong first-order logics
Christian Esp´ındola
Abstract
We prove preservation theorems for Lω1,G, the countable fragment of Vaught’s
closed game logic. These are direct generalizations of the theorems of  Los´-Tarski
(resp. Lyndon) on sentences of Lω1,ω preserved by substructures (resp. homo-
morphic images). The solution, in ZFC, only uses general features and can be
extended to several variants of other strong first-order logic that do not satisfy the
interpolation theorem; instead, the results on infinitary definability are used. This
solves an open problem dating back to 1977. Another consequence of our approach
is the equivalence of the Vopeˇnka principle and a general definability theorem on
subsets preserved by homomorphisms.
Keywords : infinitary logics, preservation theorems, infinitary model theory, categor-
ical logic
1 Introduction
 Los´-Tarski preservation theorem for first-order logic states that if a sentence is pre-
served under substructures, it is equivalent to a universal sentence, i.e., one in which,
in negation normal form, only contains universal quantifiers (see e.g., [Hod93]). This
result is essentially a corollary of a more general result on sentences preserved under ho-
momorphisms, which are equivalent to so called positive existential sentences (coherent
sentences, in the terminology of [Joh02]). Lyndon found another related preservation
theorem for sentences preserved under homomorphic images (that is, surjective homo-
morphisms). Namely, any such sentence is equivalent to a positive sentence, i.e., a sen-
tence for which, in negation normal form, no atomic formula occurs negated ([Lyn59]).
Both  Los´-Tarski and Lyndon preservation theorems have been generalized to the infini-
tary logic Lω1,ω (see [Mal65], [LE65], [Kei71]). Strong first-order logic are an extension
of the logic of Lω1,ω described in [Bur77], which share some of its properties, while
others fails. In [Bur77] it is shown the failure of the interpolation theorem, while the
question on preservation theorems holding for, e.g., Lω1,G, are left open. From the last
paragraph:
“One large problem in the model theory of strong first-order languages remains open,
which does not lend itself to abstract, descriptive-set-theoretic statement: Can we prove
for, say, Lω1,G, that any sentence preserved under substructure (resp. homomorphic
image) is equivalent to a universal (resp. positive) sentence?”
We give here a positive answer for both questions (universal and positive sentences)
in the case of Vaught’s game logic Lω1,G. The methods are however general enough to
be carried out within ZFC and to apply to a wider variety of the languages presented
in [Bur77]. Instead of considering descriptive set-theoretic arguments, which encounter
difficulties when analyzing preservation theorems, we will rely instead on a definability
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result here obtained with the aid of topos-theoretic techniques. More precisely, we
work with λ-classifying toposes, introduced in [Esp17]. These will also allow us to show
the equivalence of Vopeˇnka principle with a general definability theorem on subsets
preserved by homomorphisms.
The structure of this work is as follows: we first present the topos-theoretic argument
leading to our definability result, and later present its applications to the particular
problem of preservation by homomorphisms. We assume that the reader is acquainted
with the basic topos-theoretic machinery, particularly with section D of [Joh02] as well
as familiarity with λ-coherent logic and λ-classifying toposes from [Esp19] and [Esp17].
This is a continuation of the research project on infinitary first-order categorical logic
started by the author in [Esp19].
2 The λ-classifying topos of a κ-theory
In this section fix κ < λ such that κ is regular and λ<λ = λ. Let T be a κ-coherent
theory in Lκ+,κ, CT be its syntactic category and Modλ(T) be the full subcategory of
λ-presentable models. Assume that the category of models of T is λ-accessible (this is
the case, e.g., if λ = κ+ or, more generally, if κ ⊳ λ). Let T′ be the theory in Lλ+,λ
with the same axioms as those of T. An important result we will prove here is the
following:
Theorem 2.1. The λ-classifying topos of T′ is equivalent to the presheaf topos SetModλ(T).
Moreover, the canonical embedding of the syntactic category CT′ →֒ Set
Modλ(T) is
given by the evaluation functor, which on objects acts by sending (x, φ) to the func-
tor {M 7→ [[φ]]M}.
Proof. By hypothesis every model of T′ is a λ-filtered colimit of models in Modλ(T).
Note first that the following diagram:
CT′

 ev
//
M∼=lim−→i
Mi

✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
SetModλ(T)
M ′∼=lim−→i
evMi
  ✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
✁✁
Set
commutes up to invertible 2-cell. Here ev and evMi are the evaluation functors, defined
on objects as ev((x, φ)) = {M 7→ [[φ]]M} and evMi(F ) = F (Mi), respectively, while
lim
−→
Mi is the canonical λ-filtered colimit of λ-presentable models associated to the
model M . Note also that since λ-filtered colimits commute with λ-small limits, M ′ will
preserve, in addition to all colimits, also λ-small limits.
Let now Set[T′]λ be the λ-classifying topos of T
′. We shall prove that this latter is
equivalent to SetModλ(T) by verifying in this presheaf topos the universal property of
Set[T′]λ, i.e., that models of T
′ in a λ-topos E corresponds to λ-geometric morphisms
from E to the presheaf topos. It is enough to prove this universal property in the
particular case in which E = Set[T′]λ.
Given then the λ-classifying topos E of T′, by the completeness theorem of [Esp17] it
will have enough λ-points. Hence, there is a conservative λ-geometric morphism with
inverse image E : E //SetI such that composition with the evaluation at i ∈ I, ev(i)E
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gives a λ-point of E . Now each model of T′ in E , N : CT′ // E gives rise to models in
Set by considering their images through each ev(i)E. These correspond to unique (up
to isomorphism) λ-geometric morphisms with inverse image SetModλ(T) //Set, which
in turn induce a λ-geometric morphism with inverse image G : SetModλ(T) // SetI
and with the property that the composition G ◦ ev : CT′ // Set
Modλ(T) // SetI is the
same (up to isomorphism) as EN : CT′ // Set
I . In other words, considering E as a
subcategory of SetI , the image of G ◦ ev belongs to E .
CT′

 ev
//
N

✺✺
✺✺
✺✺
✺✺
✺✺
✺✺
✺✺
SetModλ(T)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
☛☛
E
E

SetI
ev(i)

Set
On the other hand, every object F in SetModλ(T) can be canonically expressed as a
colimit of representables, F ∼= lim−→i
[Mi,−]. In turn, each M : CT′ //Set is a colimit of
representables Mi ∼= lim−→j
[φij ,−]; since λ
<λ = λ, CT′ has size at most λ and the latter
limit is λ-small. It follows that:
F ∼= lim−→
i
[lim
−→
j
[φij ,−]C
T′
,−]Modλ(T)
∼= lim−→
i
lim
←−
j
[[φij ,−]C
T′
,−]Modλ(T)
∼= lim−→
i
lim
←−
j
ev(φij)
where the last isomorphism follows from Yoneda lemma. Now G preserves λ-small
limits and colimits, and so we will have:
G(F ) ∼= lim−→
i
lim
←−
j
G ◦ ev(φij)
and similarly on arrows. Therefore, G is completely determined (up to isomorphism)
by its value on the objects ev(φij). Since the value of G on such objects belongs to
E , and E preserves λ-small limits and colimits, it follows that G itself factors through
E . Moreover, it is the unique (up to isomorphism) inverse image of a λ-geometric
morphism corresponding to the given model in E . This finishes the proof.
3 Preservation theorems for Lω1,G
The language Lω1,G is the fragment of Vaught’s closed game logic which extends Lω1,ω
by allowing the following instance of infinitary quantification:
∀x0
∧
b0∈I
∃y0
∨
c0∈I
∀x1
∧
b1∈I
∃y1
∨
c1∈I
...
∧
i<ω
φ
b0c0b1c1...bici
i (x0, y0, ..., xi, yi) (1)
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There is a game semantics associated to the sentence (1) as follows: the first player
chooses an element x0 and a conjunct b0, then the second player chooses an element
y0 and a disjunct c0, and the game continues with ω many moves, after which the
second player wins if with the choices made during the game it is the case that each
φb0c0b1c1...bicii (x0, y0, ..., xi, yi) is satisfied in the structure M , for every i < ω. Since the
formula in the matrix corresponds to a closed subset of |M |ω × Iω, by determinacy for
closed games it follows that the game is determined, and hence the formula is said to
be true in M if the second player has a winning strategy, while it is said to be false if
the first player has a winning strategy, i.e., if:
∃x0
∨
b0∈I
∀y0
∧
c0∈I
∃x1
∨
b1∈I
∀y1
∧
c1∈I
...
∨
i<ω
¬φb0c0b1c1...bicii (x0, y0, ..., xi, yi) (2)
holds. The formula (1) generates a fragment within Vaught’s closed game logic closed
under finitary connectives and operations and containing all subformulas of (1). We
have now:
Theorem 3.1. A sentence of Lω1,G which is preserved under substructures is equivalent
to a universal sentence of Lω1,G.
Proof. We will prove the dual statement, namely, that sentences preserved upwards
along embeddings are equivalent to existential sentences. Let φ be a sentence of Lω1,G
which is preserved by embeddings, and assume without loss of generality that the
language is relational. For each relation R, including equality, in the signature (which
we can assume countable by passing to a fragment generated by φ), add a new relation
R∗ together with the theory T consisting of the following axioms:
R(x) ∧R∗(x) ⊢x ⊥
⊤ ⊢x R(x) ∨R
∗(x)
The homomorphisms in the new language will then correspond to embeddings and by
hypothesis φ is preserved. Assume first that the continuum hypothesis holds. Then, by
Theorem 2.1 the ω1-classifying topos of T is the topos Set
Modω1 (T) of presheaves over
the subcategory of (at most) countable models and embeddings. The interpretation of
φ in each such model M , say, [[φ]]M , defines therefore a subobject of S ֌ [[({},⊤)]]
in the topos. Since the embedding CT′ →֒ Set
Modλ(T) can be identified with Yoneda
embedding CT′ →֒ Sh(CT′ , τ) with the ω1-coherent topology, S corresponds to a union
of representable subobjects, and so it is the interpretation of some ω1-coherent formula
of the form
∨
j<ω1
∃i<ωxi
∧
i<ω ψ
j
i , where the ψ
j
i are atomic formulas with free variables
amongst x0, ..., xi−1. But this formula can be rewritten as the following formula ψ in
the original signature:
∨
j0<ω
∃x0
∨
j1<ω
∃x1 ...
∧
i<ω
φ
j0...ji
i
where we identify each j < ω1 with the subset {j0, j1, ...} ⊆ ω and each φ
j0...ji
i is
obtained by simply replacing in
∧
k<ω
∨
j|i+1={j0,...,ji}
ψ
j
k each relation symbol R
∗ with
¬R and reducing the size of the disjunctions to ω (this is possible since there are at
most countable many ψji ). The resulting formula ψ is now in Lω1,G (is in fact a Vaught
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sentence), is clearly existential, and its interpretation coincides with that of φ in all
countable models. We claim that it is actually equivalent to φ. Indeed, the formula
φ ↔ ψ admits an approximation by formulas in L∞,ω (see [Bur77]), i.e., there are
formulas A(φ↔ ψ,α) in L∞,ω such that φ↔ ψ is equivalent to the formal conjunction∧
α∈OrdA(φ↔ ψ,α). Hence, if φ↔ ψ was not valid, we would have:
∃M∃αM 2 A(φ↔ ψ,α).
This is a Σ1 sentence, so that since φ↔ ψ is in H(ω1), the set hereditarily of cardinality
at most countable, by Shoenfield-Levy’s theorem we can assume that M and α are in
H(ω1), which would contradict our previous result.
Suppose now that the value of the continuum is arbitrary. Consider the forcing ex-
tension V [G] in which we collapse 2ω to ω1. Since this forcing is < ω1-distributive,
formulas of Lω1,G and their countable models and embeddings remain unchanged (we
assume they are properly coded). By what we have just proved, φ is equivalent in V [G]
to an existential formula ψ, and since the validity of φ↔ ψ is a Π1 formula, it will be
true in the ground model, which finishes our proof.
Theorem 3.2. A sentence of Lω1,G which is preserved under homomorphic images is
equivalent to a positive sentence of Lω1,G.
Proof. We proceed as before for this case as well; in particular, it is enough to prove
that, assuming the continuum hypothesis, every sentence φ of Lω1,G which is preserved
under homomorphic images between countable models is equivalent, on countable mod-
els, to a positive sentence ψ of Lω1,G. Then we can prove the general case as we did
in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Extend the signature by adding countable many constant
symbols (ci)i<ω and a relation symbol S, and consider the theory T axiomatized by the
sequent:
⊤ ⊢y
∨
i<ω
y = ci
This is an ω-coherent theory and its homomorphisms are evidently surjective, so that
φ is preserved. In an entirely similar way as with the proof of Theorem 3.1, we deduce
then that there is a ω1-coherent formula ψ0 of the form
∨
j<ω1
∃i<ωxi
∧
i<ω ψ
j
i , where
the ψji are atomic formulas, and which is equivalent to φ in all countable models of T;
that is:
∀y
∨
i<ω
y = ci  φ↔ ψ0(c)
where c = c0c1..., or:
|= ∀x
[
∀y
∨
i<ω
y = xi // (φ↔ ψ0(x))
]
(3)
where x = x0x1.... Now (3) readily implies that φ |= ∀x(∀y
∨
i<ω y = xi
// ψ0(x)). In
countable models, this latter sentence ∀x(∀y
∨
i<ω y = xi
// ψ0(x)) entails:
∃x
(
∀y
∨
i<ω
y = xi ∧ ψ0(x)
)
(4)
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since that sentence and the negation of (4) implies ∀x¬(∀y
∨
i<ω y = xi), which is only
true in uncountable models. On the other hand, using (3) we see that (4) clearly
implies φ in all models. Thus, we have that in all countable models, φ is equivalent
to the sentence (4). This sentence is clearly positive, but it does not belong to Lω1,G.
To find an appropriate sentence in Lω1,G, note that (4) is equivalent to the following
second-order sentence:
∃i<ωRi
[
∀x
∨
i<ω
Ri(x) ∧
∧
i<ω
(Ri(x) ∧Ri(y) // x = y) ∧ ∃x
(∧
i<ω
Ri(xi) ∧ ψ0(x)
)]
(5)
where the (Ri)i<ω are unary relations whose sole purpose is to code the constants
(ci)i<ω, i.e., they are such that the intended interpretation of Ri(x) is ci. Now (5)
expresses φ as a projective class over Lω1,G, since the conjunct ∃x(
∧
i<ω Ri(xi)∧ψ0(x))
can clearly be rewritten, as we did in the proof of Theorem 3.1, as a sentence of Lω1,G.
Note also that in (5) (or rather, in its rewritten form in Lω1,G) every atomic formula
not involving the Ri which are quantified, appears positively in negation normal form.
It follows by results of Vaught from [Vau73] that the matrix of (5) (i.e., the formula
after the existentially quantified Ri) is equivalent in turn to a second-order assertion
of the form ∃j<ωSjθ, where θ is in Lω1,ω and has the property that every atomic
formula appears positively in negation normal form. Hence, (5) actually expresses
φ as a projective class over Lω1,ω. It follows also from [Vau73] that this resulting
second-order assertion is equivalent over countable models to a Vaught sentence ψ in
which every atomic formula appears positively in negation normal form1, i.e., a positive
sentence of Lω1,G. This finishes the proof.
Corollary 3.3. A sentence of Lω1,ω preserved under substructure (resp. homomorphic
image) is equivalent to a universal (resp. positive) sentence of Lω1,ω.
Proof. Since Lω1,ω ⊂ Lω1,G, such a sentence φ is equivalent to a universal (resp. pos-
itive) Vaught sentence Φ. By Vaught’s covering theorem (see, e.g., [Vau73]), since
Φ // φ, there is a countable ordinal α such that A(Φ, α) // φ. Thus, φ is equivalent
to the sentence A(Φ, α) which is in Lω1,ω and is universal (resp. positive).
4 A definability property equivalent to Vopeˇnka principle
As a final application of Theorem 2.1, we now prove the following:
Theorem 4.1. Let Σ be a signature and consider the category of Σ-structures and
homomorphisms. Suppose that for each structure M there is a distinguished subset SM
which is preserved by all homomophisms. Then the following are equivalent:
1. Vopeˇnka principle
2. The subsets SM are definable by an infinitary coherent formula. That is, there is
a formula φ of the form
∨
j<λ ∃i<κxi
∧
i<κ ψ
j
i , where the ψ
j
i are atomic formulas,
such that [[φ]]M = SM for all Σ-structures M .
1Indeed, see the comments in [Vau73] starting from the last paragraph of page 18. Alternatively,
by a result of Makkai, a Vaught sentence preserved by homomorphic images is equivalent to a positive
Vaught sentence.
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Proof. (2 =⇒ 1) This part is essentially contained in [AR94]. If Vopeˇnka principle
does not hold, there is a large rigid class of structures C (see [AR94]). Define now:
SM =
⋃
N∈C
⋃
f :N //M
im(f)
If S is the subfunctor of the identity defined by the SM , then S is not accessible (see
Remark in page 268 of [AR94]). Hence, it cannot be definable, as every definable
subfunctor (by an infinitary coherent formula) is clearly accessible.
(1 =⇒ 2) Assuming that Vopeˇnka principle holds, the subfunctor S is accessible
(since then a subfunctor of an accessible functor must be acccessible). Choose an
inaccessible λ such that S is λ-accessible. By Theorem 2.1, the λ-classifying topos of
the empty theory over Σ is the presheaf topos SetModλ(T). Analogously as to what
we did in the previous section, it follows that the subfunctor coincides in all models
of size less than λ with the interpretation of a λ-coherent formula. Since this latter is
computed in a model M as the λ-filtered colimit of its value on λ-presentable models,
it follows that the equivalence holds in all Σ-structures. This concludes the proof.
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